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1. Bruno Latour, “WhyHas Critique Run out of Steam?”Critical Inquiry 30 (Winter 2004):
238–39.
2. See Terry Eagleton,After Theory (New York, 2003).
The History of Theory
Ian Hunter
Do you see now why it feels so good to be a critical mind? Why critique, this most
ambiguous pharmakon, has become such a potent euphoric drug? You are always
right! When naı¨ve believers are clinging forcefully to their objects . . . you can turn all
of those attachments into so many fetishes and humiliate all the believers by showing
that it is nothing but their own projection, that you, yes you alone, can see. But as
soon as naı¨ve believers are thus inflated by some belief in their own importance, in
their own projective capacity, you strike them by a second uppercut and humiliate
them again, this time by showing that, whatever they think, their behavior is entirely
determined by the action of powerful causalities coming from objective reality they
don’t see, but that you, yes you, the never sleeping critic, alone can see. Isn’t this
fabulous? Isn’t it really worth going to graduate school to study critique?
—bruno latour, “Why Has Critique Run out of Steam?”1
One of the most striking features of recent discussions of the moment
of theory in the humanities is the lack of even proximate agreement about
what the object of such theory might be and about the language in which
it has been or should be conducted. For Terry Eagleton the object of theory
is culture—understood as the dialectical moment in which the making of
meaning encounters its own social determination—and its language is a
version of Marxian social theory, to which Eagleton has recently added
some Aristotelian ballast.2 For Robert Pippin, though, theory’s object is the
conditions of knowledge as first posed by Kant and then taken up in other
disciplines, while the language of theory is that of post-Kantian critical
philosophy.3 Other commentators take the object of theory to be language
or literature or the mode of literary production—an object possibly threat-
ened with displacement by electronically mediated images and digitized
communications—and locate theory’s language in the discourse of literary
criticism, albeit in diverse forms.4 This diversity could be extendedwithout
3. See Robert Pippin, “Critical Inquiry and Critical Theory: A Short History of Nonbeing,”
Critical Inquiry 30 (Winter 2004): 424–28.
4. See Elizabeth Abel, “Mania, Depression, and the Future of Theory,”Critical Inquiry 30
(Winter 2004): 336–39, and Fredric Jameson, “Symptoms of Theory or Symptoms for Theory?”
Critical Inquiry 30 (Winter 2004): 403–8.
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5. See Eagleton,After Theory, pp. 24–30, 44–49, 95–102.
much difficulty. Habermas makes discourse or the “ideal speech situation”
into the core object of theory, discussing it in a highly elaborated post-
Kantian social theory. For Derrida (as we shall see below) what matters is
diffe´rance, understood as the liquefaction of formalized meanings and
structures carried out in Derrida’s improvisation on the discourse of
transcendental phenomenology.
These differences are real enough to unsettle any calm investigation of
the history of theory. They have given rise to an expansive and vehement
apologetics in which a whole series of mutually hostile dyads—the formal
and the material, the semiotic and the economic, the sociological and the
psychoanalytic, the logic of diffe´rance and the logic of society—do battle
for the privilege of foundational status or else seek peace in an endless
series of dialectical reconciliations. Historical reflection on the moment of
theory is of course possible from within the field of theoretical contest
itself, but only, as it turns out, in the form of philosophical history and
historical hermeneutics. Eagleton thus historicizes the 1960s “theory
boom” in terms of the incorporation of culture itself into the productive
processes of late capitalism. This development both gives new importance
to cultural theorists, yet also ensures their impotence. That is, a predis-
position towards idealism, formalism, and relativism leaves the domain
of thematerial and economic untouched, eventually giving rise toRichard
Rorty rather than Vladimir Lenin.5 This history, however, is a pure pro-
jection of Eagleton’s theoretical doctrine—that is, his conception of cul-
ture as the intellect’s attempt to think the forces that determine its
thinking—and is thus doomed to defend a particular sectarian patch
within the field of theoretical contestation.
Rather than pursuing a philosophical history that provides theory with
unifying conditions of possibility, we should begin a history of theory by
topicalizing the fact of irresolvable conflict between rival accounts of such
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6. See The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch et al. (New York,
2001), and Theory’s Empire: An Anthology of Dissent, ed. Daphne Patai andWilliamH. Corral
(New York, 2005).
conditions. Such conflict is in keeping with the observation that the theory
boom began when a certain kind of philosophical interrogation surfaced
inside a wide variety of disciplines—linguistics, literarycriticism,sociology,
political economy, the “psy” disciplines, even jurisprudence—where it
assumed the form of an array of associated but rivalrous theoretical ver-
naculars. This is a pointer to why it is fruitless to begin a history of theory
by trying to identify its common object or shared language. Unlike natural
scientific theories, the theory that emerged in the humanities and social
sciences in the 1960s was not defined by its object because it surfaced in
disciplines with quite divergent objects: linguistics and legal studies, liter-
ature and anthropology, the study of folktales and the analysis of economic
modes of production. Further, the theoretical vernaculars that emerged at
this time differed significantly, sometimes in accordancewith theuniversity
faculties where theorists were employed, but also in accordance with
divergent (or only partially overlapping) national intellectual contexts.The
Kant that John Rawls used to reconstruct American “rational choice” po-
litical science thus differs markedly from the (post-Husserlian) Kant that
Ju¨rgen Habermas used to propel his transformation of Germanmetaphys-
ics into a communicational social theory. Similarly, while British and
French Marxists both used Louis Althusser to combat their “humanist”
predecessors, the Althusserianism that emerged from the attack on British
romantic historicism (E. P. Thompson) differed significantly from that
which emerged from the attack on French existentialist andHegelianMarx-
ism. One could make similar remarks about the difference between a lit-
erary structuralism dedicated to overthrowing the peculiarly English
phenomenon of “Leavisism” and one developing in the context of French
phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics.
It is understandable, then, that some commentators should have de-
clared the contents of theory to be so diverse as to make the term unusable.
From the standpoint of an empirically oriented intellectual history, how-
ever, the fact that this term—together with its cognates structuralism and
poststructuralism—has been used to nominate a series of intellectual de-
velopments is itself something to be investigated. The Norton Anthology of
Theory and Criticism—with its selections from Althusser and Barthes;
through Jakobson and Jameson, Kristeva and Lacan; to Saussure and
Todorov—may be regarded as weighty proof of the nominalist existence of
theory, particularlywhen taken togetherwith its omnibus countertext,The-
ory’s Empire, even if these texts also point to theory’s natural home: the
American humanities graduate school.6 If not a single object or a single
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7. For detailed historical investigations of the cultivation of particular kinds of philosophical
personae, see The Philosopher in EarlyModern Europe: The Nature of a Contested Identity, ed.
Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and IanHunter (Cambridge, 2006).
language, though, then what is it about the manifold forms of theory that
has prompted both its exponents and opponents to acquiesce in a single
name for them?
In beginning to answer this question, we can suggest that if the various
developments referred to in the moment of theory are unified neither by a
common object nor by a single theoretical language they can, however, still
be viewed as participating in a shared intellectual attitude or deportment,
albeit to different degrees. This attitude is skeptical towards empirical
experience (in a more or less Kantian way), but also towards a priori for-
malisms—which it regards as foreclosing a higher level (“transcendental”)
experience—and hence cultivates openness to breakthrough phenomena
of various kinds. It will be argued that this attitude is characteristic of a
particular kind of intellectual persona sustained by a certain inner
discipline and that providing an account of this persona and discipline is
central to, without being exhaustive of, historical reflection on themoment
of theory.7 Our first encounter with this attitude, and with its prime phil-
osophical discourse, will be paradoxical, however. For it will be anunavoid-
able (but in the endhelpful) confrontationwith thedoctrine that thehistory
of theory is an impossible undertaking.
Is a History of Theory Possible?
In an early essay entitled “‘Genesis and Structure’ andPhenomenology,”
first presented as a lecture in 1959, Jacques Derrida provides an exemplary
account of why philosophy and philosophical truth cannot be subject
to historical description. In doing so he draws deeply on some of the
central thematics of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, offering us
a revealing insight into the fundamental role played by this variant of
German university metaphysics in the emergence of what would become
known as deconstructive philosophy and, more generally, theory.
As part of his argument that, properly understood, there is no clash
between the concepts of structure and genesis, Derrida points to a series of
harmonized tensions within transcendental phenomenology itself.Hedoes
this by opening a bracket in the middle of a sentence, thus:
(it [Husserl’s phenomenology] is a philosophy of essences always
considered in their objectivity, their intangibility, their apriority; but, by
the same token, it is a philosophy of experience, of becoming, of the
temporal flux of what is lived, which is the ultimate reference; it is also a
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8. JacquesDerrida, “‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology,”Writing and Difference,
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1978), p. 156; hereafter abbreviated “GS.”
philosophy in which the notion of “transcendental experience” desig-
nates the very field of reflection, in a project which, in Kant’s eyes for
example, would have derived from teratology.)8
Not the least interesting aspect of this virtuoso parenthesis is the
manner in which it manages to encapsulate the relation between Husserl’s
metaphysics and its Kantian predecessor. InKantian termsHusserl’snotion
of “transcendental experience,” or the transcendental phenomenon,would
indeed be monstrous. After all, the whole point of Kantian phenomena is
that they never reveal the transcendent objects that may underlie them.
Such phenomena always appear within the limits of subjective categories of
understanding and forms of experience, which may never be broken
through since they constitute human (as opposed to divine or angelic)
knowledge. In seeking to go beyond Kantian metaphysics, Husserl posits a
special kind of experience. This is one in which the object self-manifests,
somehow displaying its transcendent conditions of intelligibility immedi-
ately, as an experience, hence revealing itself in the formalized “Kantian”
field of knowledge as a disturbing foreign body. This breakthroughobject—
Derrida calls it “noema” rather than noumena—offers the prospect of a
fundamental “opening” to being as something “other,” and thus also the
prospect of overcoming ossified identity and the chance of “becoming” in
the flux of life. Derrida also regards this breakthrough object as the con-
dition of all possible “regions” ofmeaning and structure (whichwill emerge
to meet it) and as the condition of their undoing (as the result of further
anarchic breakthroughs):
This real nonappurtenance to any region at all, even to the archi-region,
this anarchy of the noema is the root and very possibility of objectivity
and of meaning. . . . In any event, the transcendentality of the opening is
simultaneously the origin and the undoing, the condition of possibility
and a certain impossibility of every structure and of every systematic
structuralism. [“GS,” p. 163]
We will return to this characteristically vatic remark below, as it contains
important clues to the inseparability of structuralism and poststructural-
ism. For the moment, though, we are concerned with the consequences of
this “transcendental experience” or opening to being for the prospects of a
history of theory. The short answer is that it makes the history of theory
impossible. In a striking reprise of the history of Christian university
metaphysics, Derrida posits the transcendent onto which philosophy opens
as the domain of infinite omnitemporal being as truth, in relation to which
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all merely finite, time-bound viewpoints—the domain of history—must
remain uncomprehending and subordinate:
This meaning of truth, or of the pretension to truth, is the requirement
of an absolute, infinite omni-temporality and universality, without
limits of any kind. The Idea of truth, that is the Idea of philosophy or of
science, is an infinite Idea, an Idea in the Kantian sense. Every totality,
every finite structure is inadequate to it. Now the Idea or the project
which animates and unifies every determined historical structure, every
Weltanschauung is finite: on the basis of the structural description of a
vision of the world one can account for everything except the infinite
opening to truth, that is, philosophy. [“GS,” p. 160]
Given the usual cares and concerns of temporal life, though, what is it
that might motivate someone to take up this remarkable deportment of
openness to infinite omnitemporal being? Derrida first answers this ques-
tion by appealing to the self-enclosed inadequacy of all naturalistic and
causalist “genetic” viewpoints: “The transition to the phenomenological
attitude is made necessary, thus, by the impotence or philosophical fragility
of genetism when the latter, by means of a positivism which does not
understand itself, believes itself capable of enclosure by a ‘science-of-facts’
(Tatsachenwissenschaft), whether this be a natural science or science of the
mind” (“GS,” p. 159). This too is an important pointer—to theory’s
posture of critique adopted in relation to so-called empiricist andpositivist
sciences—to which we shall return. For the moment, though, it is enough
to observe that this strategy cannot explain why anyone would adopt the
“phenomenological attitude” because it assumes that this attitude has
already been adopted; that is, it presumes that nonphenomenological
sciences are indeed claustral formalisms whose finite views of the world
vainly foreclose the “infinite opening to truth.”
Derrida’s second and more fundamental answer to this question is of
much greater interest, however, even if it is unsatisfactory in the end. For
here Derrida answers in terms of the special intellectual act—the “tran-
scendental reduction” or epoche´—that one must perform in order to enter
the condition of openness to the infinite and to have the transcendental
experience. The transcendental reduction is the inner act of suspending
one’s commitments to all empirical viewpoints and positivistic formalisms,
thereby preparing oneself for the irruptive appearance of the noematic
transcendental phenomenon. According to Derrida, however, the question
that we are driving towards—the question of the possibility of the tran-
scendental reduction—cannot be answered because it cannot be asked. As
the source of all possible structures of meaning and acts of questioning, the
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9. For the role of such self-questioning in setting the scene for acts of ethical self-
problematization and self-transformation, seeMichel Foucault,The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert
Hurley, vol. 3 of The History of Sexuality (Harmondsworth, 1985), pp. 25–32. For an account of its
role in motivating and shaping the cultivation of a distinctive and prestigious philosophical self or
way of life, see Pierre Hadot, Plotinus, or the Simplicity of Vision, trans.Michael Chase (Chicago,
1993); Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (Madison,
Wis., 1992), pp. 118–58; andHunter, “TheMorals of Metaphysics: Kant’s Groundwork as
Intellectual Paideia,”Critical Inquiry 28 (Summer 2002): 908–29.
transcendental reduction cannot itself be interrogated for its conditions of
possibility:
The question of the possibility of the transcendental reduction cannot
expect an answer. It is the question of the possibility of the question,
opening itself, the gap on whose basis the transcendental I, which
Husserl was tempted to call “eternal” . . . is called upon to ask itself
about everything, and particularly about the possibility of the
unformed and naked factuality of nonmeaning, in the case at hand, for
example, of its own death. [“GS,” pp. 167–68]
But this too is an example of someone already committed toaphilosophy
attempting to motivate its adoption from the inside. The notion that ques-
tions ask themselves is an instance of a philosophy attempting to lift itself
into existence via its own bootstraps. And in the end it fails to capture the
allure and power of the transcendental reduction itself. A different kind of
questioning and mode of attention is required to bring this to light. Rather
than imagining that questions ask themselves or that positivist sciences
declare their own insufficiency, wemust shift our attention to themeans by
which we are induced to enter into a certain kind of questioning and to
cultivate a certain inner distrust of available knowledge. This entails asking
such questions as, What kind of relation to myself do I establish when I
seek to suspend commitment to my existing “natural” knowledges and
experiences? What is it about me that is called into question and targeted
for transformation as a result of this? What kind of spiritual or intellectual
exercise do I perform on myself when undertaking the transcendental
reduction? And towhat kind of persona do I aspire on the basis of this inner
exercise? With such questions, which derive from a certain form of intel-
lectual history, we open a space for the history of theory.9
The pertinence of these questions will be clear as soon as we turn to one
of Husserl’s characteristic formulations of the epoche´ or transcendental
reduction; for what emerges is indeed a highly distinctive kind of spiritual
exercise:
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10. EdmundHusserl,The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans.
David Carr (Evanston, Ill., 1970), pp. 151–52.
11. CompareHadot’s comments on the transcendental reduction as a variation on the long-
standing exercise of “return to the self,” in Hadot, Philosophy as aWay of Life: Spiritual Exercises
from Socrates to Foucault, trans. Chase, ed. Arnold Davidson (Oxford, 1995), pp. 65–66.
We perform the epoche´—wewho are philosophizing in a new way—as
a transformation of the attitude which precedes it not accidentally but
essentially, namely, the attitude of natural human existence which, in its
total historicity, in life and science, was never before interrupted. . . .
What must be shown in particular and above all is that through the
epoche´ a new way of experiencing, of thinking, of theorizing, is opened
to the philosopher; here, situated above his own natural being and above
the natural world, he loses nothing of their being and their objective
truths and likewise nothing at all of the spiritual acquisitions of his
world-life or those of the whole historical communal life; he simply
forbids himself—as a philosopher, in the uniqueness of his direction of
interest—to continue the whole natural performance of his world-life;
that is, he forbids himself to ask questions which rest upon the ground
of the world at hand, questions of being, questions of value, practical
questions, questions about being or not-being, about being valuable,
being useful, being beautiful, being good, etc. . . . This is not a “view,”
an “interpretation” bestowed upon the world. Every view about . . .
“the” world has its ground in the pregiven world. It is from this very
ground that I have freedmyself through the epoche´; I stand above the
world, which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a
phenomenon.10
Despite Derrida’s insistence that it lies beyond historical conditions of
possibility, here we can recognize the transcendental reduction as an
instance of an entirely characteristic and eminently historical exercise in
philosophical self-questioning and self-transformation.11 Initiated by an
existential act of self-forbidding or abstention from the “world at hand,”
the epoche´ is something performed rather than investigated. It is something
that individuals do to themselves when, as the result of their induction into
a specialized form of self-questioning, they are already convinced of a fun-
damental ethical shortcoming—their closure within the dead “natural”
forms of understanding—which can only be overcome by performing the
innerwork thatwill turn them into a certain kindofphilosopheror theorist.
In this regard it might look as if Eagleton is better placed to grasp the
concrete motivation of the critical attitude than Derrida, for Eagleton
ascribes this to history, in fact to the crisis that supposedly occurred when
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12. Eagleton,After Theory, p. 27.
13. See IlsetrautHadot, Seneca und die griechisch-ro¨mischeTradition der Seelenleitung (Berlin,
1969), and Paul Rabbow, Seelenfu¨hrung:Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike (Munich, 1954).
culture was incorporated into late capitalism and lost its autonomy, thereby
impelling critical self-consciousness: “It is this critical self-reflectionwhich
we know as theory. Theory of this kind comes about when we are forced
into a new self-consciousness about what we are doing.”12 In treating the
distrust of empirical knowledges and ordinary experience as something
compelled by history, however, Eagleton obscures the contingent character
of the requisite acts of self-problematization no less than does Derrida. He
turns the program of thought thinking its own conditions into something
required of reason by history rather than something required of university
students undergoing a certain kind of intellectual formation.
The epoche´ is an act of inner ethical labor or ascesis, oriented to a certain
kind of self-transformation. In this regard, from a historical viewpoint, the
transcendental reduction is simply one among a series of exercises in
philosophical self-culture. Since classical antiquity these have provided
intellectuals with the ethical means for such undertakings as controlling
anger, conquering the fear of death, restraining the passions, purging the
senses, ascending to a vision of God, and so on.13 The only thing that sets
the transcendental reduction and the “phenomenological attitude” apart in
this field is the particular means it chooses to lead its inductees across the
threshold of self-questioning and self-transformation and theparticular in-
tellectual persona that it seeks to cultivate on the basis of this regimen. The
apprentice phenomenologist or theorist is thus not someone whose task is
to control their anger or restrain their lust—not someone whomustmoni-
tor and control their relation to sexual partners or political subordinates—
but someone who must forbid themselves from continuing what Husserl
calls “the whole natural performance of his world-life.” In fact, what is en-
joined is an act of inner abstention from a whole array of knowledges and
judgments arising from the “factual” sciences and practical morality. The
aim is for the individual to suspend ordinary consciousness and to cultivate
a specific kind of inner attentiveness—“as a philosopher, in the uniqueness
of his directionof interest”—inorder to attainwhatDerrida calls the“virgin
glance.” This is a state of presuppositionless heightened anticipation into
which the transcendental phenomenon can irrupt, bringingwith it a viewof
the world briefly untouched by the designs of human hands and human
consciousness. In other words, in its first iteration the transcendental
reduction is a spiritual exercise for a certain kind of university metaphysi-
cian rather than, for example, a courtier or a warrior, a monk in the service
of Christ or a jurist in the service of a prince.
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This cultivated openness to being can appear as a state of rapt attentive-
ness to the self-manifestation of things. It is no less present, though, in the
posture of intellectual contempt for the sciences of facts thatmust beplaced
under abstention if one is to enter into the critical frame of mind. In any
case, it seems clear thatwhat is at stake here is not a breakthrough to infinite,
omnitemporal, and universal being—nor indeed the manifestation of a
crisis in the mode of cultural production—but a highly specific kind of
spiritual exercise. This is one that performs the transcendent breakthrough
in a kind of inner theater that must be staged by all those undergoing this
particular form of philosophical self-cultivation. Above all, we can note the
shaping of a certain kind of intellectual persona, characterized by the desire
to interrupt ordinary life and knowledge in order to rise above it, to look
down on it, to be someone for whom and to whom the world declares itself
in all its purity. This persona, who critically subordinates all of the regions
of knowledge to the contemplation of a single irruptive source of meaning
and structure, may be regarded as an improvisation on the figure of the
Christian university metaphysician; for that was always the role of this
personage.
Let us assume then, for the sake of the argument at least, that we have
opened a space for the history of theory and that we have done so by
showing how the philosophical demonstration of the impossibility of such
a spacemay it itself be treated as a historical phenomenon. Further, indoing
so, we have gone some way to identifying the attitude or deportment that
we have suggested is the characteristic feature of the moment of theory. If
this moment was characterized by the surfacing of a certain intellectual
conduct—minimally, the abstention from empiricist or positivist knowl-
edges through insight into their sleeping structures—then we can suggest
that this moment represented the (unexpected and remarkable) dissemi-
nation of the spiritual exercises and self-stylization of anupdateduniversity
metaphysics. It is a central feature of this metaphysics that it constitutes a
second-order operation performed on the field of existing knowledges
and sciences—not second-order in the sense ofmetalanguage to object lan-
guage but in the sense of an act of inner self-problematization and self-
transformation performed on sciences that can be constituted as merely
factual or “natural” for the purposes of this exercise. This at least provides
us with a way into the fields of structuralism and poststructuralism.
The Structuralist Prelude
Derrida’s conception of structuralism in his 1959 lecture—where it refers
to formalizations of knowledge that occlude transcendental experience—
would not have been understood during the first phase of structuralist
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14. See Zellig Harris,Methods in Structural Linguistics (Chicago, 1951).
15. See Vladimir Propp,Morphology of the Folktale, trans. Louis A.Wagner (Austin, Tex., 1968).
16. For examples, see NoamChomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague, 1957).
theory in the 1960s, at least not inAnglo-Americanuniversities. In factwhat
would become the intellectual glamour termof the 1960sfirst emerged from
a rather obscure positive science, structural linguistics, or American struc-
turalism as it was sometimes called. Associatedwith the linguisticfieldwork
studies of Leonard Bloomfield (1887–1949), structure in this empirical sense
refers to the patterns of co-occurrence or “distribution” of phonological or
syntactic items in observed stretches of text or discourse. Zellig Harris’s
studies of systematic transformations (in the formation of relative clauses)
are structuralist in this sense.14 But so too is Vladimir Propp’s taxonomy of
the recurrent “functions”—characteristic story events—in a corpus of
folktales.15
Despite the sophistication of its taxonomic notations, and regardless of
Bloomfield’s definitive descriptions of several native American languages,
this kind of empirical structural linguistics was virtually unknown to the
broader humanities academy until it was attacked and (supposedly) super-
seded by Noam Chomsky during the 1960s. Somewhat confusingly, it was
Chomsky’s generative grammar that became widely identified with struc-
turalism and that for a brief but important period—from themid-1960s to
the mid-1970s—became a metonym for theory in a new and portentous
sense: as an activity that undermined and superseded empirical knowledge
by ostensibly revealing its underlying virtual conditions of possibility.
Chomksy’s generative structuralism claimed and assumed this status in
part because of the kinds of rules that it used. Unlike the notations of
Bloomfieldian linguistics, which were understood as a compact means of
representing observed distributional patterns, Chomsky employed alge-
braic devices, interpreted as “generative grammars.” These were regarded
as generating formal relations (called “deep structure”) that determinedthe
form in which syntax would be observed (“surface structure”).16
It was not, though, the technical specificity of Chomsky’s generative
grammar that was responsible for its wide (if short-lived) impact on the
humanities academy. Rather, it was the metaphysical and cultural signifi-
cance that could be claimed for generative grammar that allowed it tobriefly
incarnate the power of theory in the humanities, even for academicswhose
training precluded them fromunderstanding the formalism.The key to this
power lay in Chomsky’s claim that in generating deep structure his gram-
mar was determining the form in which the subject could know language.
This means the subject cannot acquire languages through imitative learn-
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ing, as the grammar will generate sentences never heard before. It also
means that linguistics is not a theory of an empirical object, language, but
a theory of the intellectual operations in man that allows language to be
experienced as a particular kind of object.17
As a result of this antibehaviorist and antiempiricist interpretationof the
grammar—that is, the treatment of it as underdetermined by empirically
observable language—Chomsky proclaimed the grammar to be innate,
positing the preexistence of a “Universal Grammar” that determines the
form in which a child would select the grammar for a particular empirical
language. If we consider the manner in which Chomsky makes this claim,
however—“For acquisition of language to be possible at all there must be
some sort of initial delimitation of the class of possible systems to which ob-
served samples may conceivably pertain; the organism must, necessarily, be
preset to search for and identify certain kinds of structural regularities”18—
then it is clear that we are dealing with a version of the Kantian transcen-
dental deduction, that is, a style of metaphysical argument in which the
supposed indeterminacy of empirical experience is used to motivate the
necessary presence of a priori structures in the subject of this experience.19
The difference in Chomsky’s case is that the transcendental structures are
also treated as hard-wired cognitive processes. The language learner in
Chomsky’s structuralism thus conforms to Foucault’s account of the figure
ofMan that emerges in themodern human sciences as a “strange empirico-
transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be
attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.”20
Just what it was about the 1960s humanities academy that made it so
receptive to Chomksy’s antiempiricist construction of theory remains a
topic for further intellectual-historical research. There is, though, a clear
historical precursor to this event, one that is full of pointers to what it was
in Chomsky’s discourse that made it so attractive to humanities academics.
In Wilhelmine Germany, Hermann Cohen, a member of the Marburg
school of neo-Kantians, published a history of the calculus that would have
a cultural impact out of all proportion to its apparently recondite topic.21
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Cohen treated the relation between the differential operations of the
calculus and its determinate outputs—functions and integral numbers—
as a model for human knowledge as such. He did so on the presupposition
that Kant had correctly formulated the problem of knowledge in terms of
the relation between a priori intellectual operations and sensuous intui-
tions. Like Chomsky’s similar treatment of generative grammar, Cohen’s
metaphysical interpretation of the calculus was not generally understood
in its technical details. Yet its culturalmessage—that all apparentlyobjective
things are the products of formal differential relations—was widely
absorbed by humanist intellectuals, not least because of the explicatory
work undertaken byCohen’s disciple, ErnstCassirer. According toCassirer:
“The basic idea of Cohen’s work can be stated quite briefly: if we want to
achieve a true scientific grounding of logic, we should not begin from any
sort of completed existence. . . . We should not begin with any sort of ob-
jective Being . . . for every “being” is in the first place a product and a result
which the operation of thought and its systematic unity has as a presup-
position.”22Thismeans that amathematical or physical concept “cannotbe
comprehended, as long as we seek any sort of presentational correlate for
it in the given; the meaning only appears when we recognize the concept as
the expression of a pure relation, uponwhich rests the unity andcontinuous
connection of the members of a manifold.”23
This strategy of treating the formal calculus as a general model for the
dissolution of substantive objects into formal relations is repeated inChom-
sky’s discourse. Chomskyan linguistics is thus structuralist or relational,not
on account of the nature of language, but on account of theuseof generative
grammar as a metaphor for an antisubstantialist cultural outlook. This
metaphorical strategy allowed themetaphysical import of generativegram-
mar to be carried on in simple teachable doctrines—for example, the doc-
trine that speech sounds are not so much positive phenomena as they are
constituted by purely relational differences within the systemof language—
which could be learned as cultural truths by students untrained in the
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mathematical formulation of the grammar itself. The immediate impact of
these talismanic doctrines—and we should not forget the thrill of cultural
aggression and transcendence that accompanied their first hearing—is
symptomatic of an audience already predisposed to cultivate the antiposi-
tivist metaphysical outlook that would be labelled theory.Moreworkneeds
to be done, though, to determine whether this was the result of a residual
antipositivist metaphysics present in the American humanities academy,
reinforced by occasional imports from Germany—for example, the trans-
lation of Cassirer’s works from the 1940s—and embedded in underlying
currents of Judeo-Christian thought and belief.24
Due to the technical complexity of generative grammar and the uncom-
promising formalist scientificity of the MIT research program, in the end
it was notChomskyan linguistics that functionedas thebridgeheadthrough
which structuralist theory entered the 1960s Anglo-American humanities
academy. Strangely enough, this would take place via aworkoriginallypub-
lished in 1916, Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics. It is
symptomatic of the key role played by Saussure’s text (and themany digests
of it) in the moment of theory that one can say that its central terms are
still so widely known in universities that there is little need to rehearse them
here. Perhaps it will be enough to say that Saussure became posthumously
famous for elaborating an apositive or relational conception of language
and signs more generally, a semiotics. According to this conception, what-
ever is manifest at the level of actual speech (parole) is understood to be
lacking in positive intelligibility, finding its conditions of possibility at
another level altogether, in the purely apositive relations of the language
system or code (langue), which exists as an atemporal (synchronic) total-
ity.25 In other words, Saussure’s text provided another version of the neo-
Kantian treatment of the “language system” as a model for the relational
or structural character of human knowledge as such. Given that Saussurean
linguistics could never match the technical sophistication of the analyses
carried out at MIT during the 1960s and 1970s, it was not greater scientific
adequacy that permitted Saussure to eclipse Chomsky in the humanities
academy.26 Rather, it was the easier access that Saussure’s nonformal
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exposition provided to the relational model of language, that is, to the
culturally driven metaphysical interpretation of grammar.
No less significant for the Anglo-American receptionof Saussure’s struc-
turalism, however, was the metaphysical elaboration it had undergone in
a series of European academic milieux dominated by transcendental phe-
nomenology. The first andmost important of these was its passage through
the so-called Prague school structuralismof the 1930s. Praguewas themajor
eastern European hub for Husserl’s phenomenology, and Prague school
structuralists such as Roman Jakobson and JanMukarˇovsky´ supplied Saus-
sure’s somewhat modest text with an explicitly Husserlian elaboration,
thereby intensifying its metaphysical articulation in a way that parallels
Chomsky’s neo-Kantian transformation of empirical structuralism. In a
move symptomatic of the transcendental reduction, linguistic structurewas
thus declared not to be a factual or empirical matter but to be a “phenom-
enological reality” consisting of virtual relations from which sounds and
meanings emerge. According to Mukarˇovsky´, “Saussure’s discovery of the
foundations of the internal structure of the linguistic sign differentiated
the sign both from mere acoustic ‘things’ (such as natural sounds) and
from mental processes. . . . Thus attention was directed to the internal
organization of the literary work.”27
With this transition from a neo-Kantian to a Husserlian metaphysical
construal of the language metaphor, we are on the cusp of poststructural-
ism. If, in accordance with the Husserlian interpretation, the relational
structure of language turns out to be unanchored either in things or in
thought, but instead forms a space in which linguistic objects appear un-
expectedly, breaking through their formal-intentional constraints, thenwe
are on the edge of a new metaphysical interpretation of language. This
would take the form of a negative theology of the speaking subject, showing
not how the relations of language deliver the world to consciousness but
how they subvert this logocentric subject. Its rendezvous with the signified
detoured through the diffe´rance of the chain of signifiers, the subject is
forced to suspend its habitual meanings and is placed in a condition of pure
openness to an unscriptedmeaning or pleasure,whichwill count as ahigher
form of (transcendental) experience. Poststructuralism thus emerged
through the Husserlian reinterpretation of the language metaphor, trans-
forming its cultural significance in accordance with the regimen of the
transcendental reduction and substituting new cultural contents via the
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theme of dissolution of the subject in an epiphanic disclosure of (impos-
sible) meaning. In other words, poststructuralism represents amutation in
the means for cultivating an antipositivist intellectual persona. But we are
getting ahead of ourselves.
Those familiar with the final chapters of Foucault’s The Order of Things
will perhaps detect a certain similarity between the history of theory that
we are beginning to outline and the “archaeology of the human sciences”
sketched in those chapters. There, Foucault too refuses to treat the linguis-
tic, sociological, and “psy” sciences that would dominate the moment of
theory as if they were defined by a common object or unified by a single
theory. Rather, he regards them as emerging within a shared epistemic
space. This episteme is formed by three dimensions or forces:mathematical
formalizations and the physical sciences; the empirical sciences of biology,
linguistics, and economics; and, crucially, the dimension of (Kantian)
transcendental philosophical reflection. Moreover, Foucault treats this
philosophical reflection as performing a work of interrogation and trans-
formation of the empirical sciences. This is one that excavates themnot for
their positive objects but for the structures in Man that both determine his
consciousness and yet make him capable of comprehending and thus per-
haps outflanking this determination.28 Something like this account could
of course be applied to both Chomsky’s neo-Kantian and the Prague
school’s phenomenological reworking of structural linguistics.
Nonetheless, despite these similarities and despite all that can still be
learned from it, Foucault’s archaeology of the human sciences cannot pro-
vide a framework for a history of theory of the kind envisaged here. It turns
out that Foucault’s construction of the episteme is itself toodeeply informed
by transcendental phenomenology to treat thismetaphysics as an historical
phenomenon. This is in part due to the fact that Foucault views the episteme
as an apositive relational structure inside which cognate arrays of positive
sciences emerge. But it is also because he treats the advent of a new episteme
as resulting from a fundamental rupture in relation to a preceding one, a
sudden transformation of the whole structure of knowledge typically
brought about by a crisis in knowledge. In this event we can clearly see the
ghost of the transcendental reduction and the intellectual crisis it isdesigned
to induce.
It is unhelpful, however, to see the structuralist onset of the moment
of theory in this way. The phenomenological reworking of Saussure, for
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example, does not announce the sudden advent of the modern episteme of
the human sciences; rather it indicates a contested intellectualperformance,
indicative of the intervention ofHusserlianmetaphysicswith its prestigious
persona, taking place (initially at least) in certain central and eastern Euro-
pean universities. Further, the fact that Propp’s descriptive morphology of
the folktale underwent a phenomenological reworking at the hands of Le´vi-
Strauss does notmean that suchmorphologies simplydroppedofftheplanet.
Drawing on Milman Parry’s earlier studies of Homer, in 1960 Albert Lord
could still provide a classic descriptive account of Serbo-Croatian epic songs.
Lord treats the narrative patterns of these songs not as apositive relational
structures but as positive formulae for oral composition, learned imitatively
by highly practiced but illiterate singers.29 Empirical and descriptive knowl-
edges do not vanish at the touch of phenomenology’s epochalwandbut con-
tinue in academic milieux where the phenomenological attitude is not
cultivated and where the persona of the phenomenological theorist may be
non grata. Similarly, despite his behaviorist presuppositions and empiricist
method, Bloomfield’s descriptions of Native American languages remain
standards regardless of his supposed supersession by Chomskyan theory.
In short, while Foucault’s archaeology provides important pointers for
a history of theory—particularly in his account of the emergence of awhole
series of critical theories from the post-hoc philosophical reworking of
empirical knowledges—this account needs to be rendered in a more
positive-historical manner. Drawing on an approach inspired in part by
Foucault’s own late history of philosophical ascetics, we can learn to treat
this reworking as, in the first instance, something that the theorist performs
on him- or herself. In theory’s problematization of positive knowledgeswe
can learn to see neither the recovery of freshlyminted objects frombeneath
a sleepy positivism nor the interruption of a stale “world-life” by a reno-
vated experience of the world, but something else altogether. We can learn
to identify an act of self-problematization initiatingaparticularkindofspir-
itual exercise. This is one from which the theorist will emerge in the form
of a persona who can look down on the positive knowledges as vestiges of
a lower kindof self. Understanding thehistoryof theorymeansunderstand-
ing the circumstances inwhich this act and exercise couldbe recovered from
the history of university metaphysics, disseminated in new pedagogical
forms, andput towork in and around awhole arrayof empiricaldisciplines.
Organizing the Event
It should already be clear that the structuralist phase of the moment of
theory was ghosted by its poststructuralist partner from the beginning and
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that the latter does not really supersede the former. Even in 1959, before
many in the humanities academy had heard of structuralism and while
many of the leading theorists were still children, Derrida could say:
“Moreover, it is always something like an opening which will frustrate the
structuralist project. What I can never understand, in a structure, is that by
means of which it is not closed” (“GS,” p. 160). The reason for this is that
transcendental phenomenology and its central instrument, the transcen-
dental reduction, treat formalized structures as that which must be sus-
pended or abstained from if consciousness is to transcend its “natural”
forms and open itself to the irruptive presence of the transcendental phe-
nomenon. The surfacing of poststructuralism in the late 1960s was thus
not an historical event driven by the discovery of epistemic weaknesses in
structuralism. To the extent that it proclaimed structuralism’s closure to
“transcendental experience,” it was an event wholly internal to the phe-
nomenological regimen, where it signifies the intellectual performance of
putting formalized knowledges under suspension in order to prepare the
theorist for the irruption of something entirely other. What was at stake
was a cultural-political battle in the humanities academy inwhich theshort-
lived resurgence of neo-Kantian structuralism would be overcome by its
neo-Husserlian rival.
Rather than attempting to catalogue the explosionof theoreticalgestures
resulting from this development, I will simply identify and illustrate two
key intellectual figures present in all of them:first, thefigureof thought(and
ascesis) in which the formalist calm is shattered by an irruptive event; and,
second, the conception of history itself as hermeneutic revelation involving
the sudden eclipse of structures of thought under the impact of a novel
phenomenon. With regard to the first of these, the generic form assumed
is that of the appearance of an unscripted event, captured in thedyad theory
and event. According to this figure, the irruptive event actually emerges
from the heart of the formalization itself, at the very pointwhere this eludes
everyday consciousness and opens itself to something unthought or not yet
thought. Derrida provides us with the pattern whose recondite character
has proved no obstacle to its exoteric dissemination:
In effect the irruption of the logos, the accession to human conscious-
ness of the idea of an infinite task of reason, does not occur only
through a series of revolutions which at the same time would be self-
conversions, seeming to tear open a previous finitude in order to lay
bare the power of a hidden infinity and to give voice to the dynamis of a
silence. These ruptures, which at the same time are unveilings (and also
coverings up, for the origin dissimulates itself immediately beneath the
new domain of uncovered or produced objectivity) are always already
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indicated, Husserl recognises, “in confusion and in the dark,” that is,
not only in the most elementary forms of life and human history, but
closer and closer in animality and nature in general. [“GS,” p. 165]
We can find a more recent formulation in this comment from Alain
Badiou:
But from the point of view of singular truth we have an access from the
event itself and not from preconstituted knowledge. It’s very important.
The truth is not a question of knowledge; it is the defection of
knowledge. This is the reason why the people who defend knowledge
are against events: the subject which is constitutedwithin a truth, in a
way, has no need of knowledge. Such a subject is a transformation of
knowledge, a complete transformation of knowledge.30
If wewere to regard this kind of formulation as a set of veiled instructions
for a certain work of the self on the self, then it would say something like
the following: Treat the structures of knowledge and everydaymorality you
have at your disposal not only as congealed forms covering an anarchic
infinite domain of being but also as themselves containing this being, in the
form of an unthought irruption, to which youmust attune yourself inorder
to be properly open to the infinite.
This set of instructions can be and indeed has been put to work in a
great variety of ways in several adjacent disciplines or disciplines rendered
adjacent by the phenomenological regimen—literary theory,hermeneutics,
social theory, psychoanalysis—often with rich effects and powerful affects.
Derrida himself, for example, could reappropriate a semioticsalreadytrans-
formed by phenomenology in order to make signs or writing function as
that which suspended ordinary meaning and subjectivity. In an essay
that played an important role in disseminating theory to the American
humanities academy—itwasfirst presented as a lecture at a celebratedJohns
Hopkins colloquium in 1966—he could thus declare that the systemof signs
delays the appearance of meaning through an infinite “play of significa-
tion,” suspending the “transcendental signified” and closing the history of
metaphysics by expelling “being as presence.”31 A few years later, Roland
Barthes could provide the following improvisation, which varies the theme
by metaphorically identifying the disruptive character of writing with its
material or bodily character: “Writing is the destruction of every voice, of
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every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space
where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting
with the very identity of the body writing.”32 Julia Kristeva makes use of La-
canian psychoanalysis—aFreudianism transformedbyphenomenology—to
push the corporeal metaphorics of writing even further. Kristeva channels
a psychoanalytic conception of bodily drives into the linguistic domain via
her conception of the semiotic. This is understood as a presignificatory di-
mension of language inwhich the drives are discharged through such things
as rhythm and tone, standing thus in opposition to the dimension she calls
the “symbolic,” the domain of meaning supported by syntax.33
In all of these versions, the Husserlian thematics of identity—the “nat-
ural” identity perpetuated through the occlusion of infinite being (the
other) and the epiphanic identity briefly attained through its irruption—is
never far away. In Kristeva’s poetics this identity drama is played out on the
threshold between her semiotic and symbolic domains. Here it is given
shape by Lacan’s conception of identity formation as an introjection of the
image of the being I must become for meaning to be possible—themirror
phase—which is nonetheless perpetually under threat from the deliriumof
the corporeal semiotic. This corporealization of the transcendental event
was of course only a metaphorical improvisation on the basic theme.Given
its Husserlian genesis, the phenomenological attitude could always return
in its abstract philosophical form, as in Badiou’s earlier-cited comment that
“truth is not a question of knowledge; it is the defection of knowledge.”
If the history of theory we have been sketching is tenable, however, then
there will be no semiotic in the intended Kristevan sense. More generally,
there will be no corporeal or material level of signification or writing in a
relation of perpetual subversion to meaning, the transcendental signified,
or the metaphysics of presence. That is because Kristeva’s semiotic and
its analogues are not a universal feature of language—something whose
existence could be demonstrated to any kind of person—but something
brought into existence through the cultivation of a specialized virtuoso
persona. Kristeva’s semiotic is what appears when the spiritual exercise of
the transcendental epoche´ is deployed in the register of literary hermeneu-
tics. It is what becomes available for contemplation when a properly initi-
ated reader forbids themselves the natural meaning of the text and their
natural world-life, thereby taking up an inner deportment of pureopenness
to the world—here the delirious epiphany of the drives in language.
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This delirium is of course perfectly contained within the exercise of the
hermeneutic epoche´ itself, where it functions as a kind of honor badge of
transcendental openness, the mark of a prestigious persona that Kristeva
herself occupies. None of this detracts from the allure and force of the
readings performed by Barthes and Kristeva, which are indeed remarkable
performances by virtuosi of the critical persona. It does, however, restrict
them to a particular historical and institutional milieu, leaving them
not as breakthroughs to a universal truth about language and being but
as instances of a particularly intense hermeneutics of the self—one that
envisages such breakthroughs as the telos of a particular exercise in
self-cultivation—sitting alongside a plurality of other such exercises.
Metaphysical History
The second figure of thought fuelling the explosion of theory is a
conception of history itself as a metaphysical hermeneutics tracking the
breakthroughs of being into time. European university metaphysics can be
characterized as an academic discipline (or culture) whose thematics con-
cern the relation between an infinite, atemporal, self-active,world-creating
intellect and a finite, “duplex” (intellectual-corporeal) worldly being. Since
the seventeenth century one of this discipline’s central tasks has been to
forestall the autonomy of positive knowledges by tethering them to philo-
sophical reflection on this relation of finite to infinite being.34 In this
context, the philosophical history that would eventually accompany the
moment of theory took shape as a metaphysical hermeneutics. The path-
breaking instance of this metaphysical hermeneutics of history is to be
found in Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason. Here Kant
reworked the terms of his own metaphysics of morals by transposing the
relation between noumenal moral being and man’s finite sensuous nature
into a temporal register. He treated this relation as one in which history
would take place as the progressive refinement of man’s sensuous nature,
more or less in accordance with a Protestant account of the descramental-
ization and dehistoricization of religion.35This would eventually lead to the
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appearance of beings capable of governing themselves through pure reason
in the temporal sphere: the kingdom of God on earth.36 Kant’s strongly
eschatological historicized metaphysics represented a self-conscious rejec-
tion of the antimetaphysical political historiography associated with civil
philosophy, and it would have important ripple effects, not only in Hegel’s
metaphysical historicism but also in Husserl’s.37
In Husserl’s version of metaphysical history it is not religion that acts as
proxy for humanity’s self-development but philosophy itself. Further, the
principle of infinite omnitemporal being has been relocated. It has been
transposed from the register of the divine intellect to that of the world, now
understood as a self-acting, self-manifesting source of all meanings and
things (the Lebenswelt). Man, however, remains stationed where university
metaphysics has always placed him, enclosed in a finitude that compelshim
to seek openness to the infinite. In projecting this metaphysics into the
temporal register, Husserl develops a philosophical history with a highly
distinctive pattern. This is one characterized by a lapsarian formalistic
occlusion of lifeworld intuitions and thus by an orientation to a future in
which a metaphysics capable of breaking through the dead formalist cara-
paces will again (briefly) make contact with transcendental experience and
the living world.
Ironically, one of the first victims of this updated metaphysical herme-
neutics of history was Kant himself, whom Husserl could now portray as
the architect of a philosophical formalism incapable of making contact
with the transcendental phenomenon.38 In fact this anachronistic view of
Kant—which of course presumes the truth of Husserl’s own adaptation of
university metaphysics—was crucial for the elaboration of the philosoph-
ical history that would accompany the moment of theory. It permitted a
whole variety of disciplines to be treated as Kantian transcendental for-
malisms, that is, as sciences whose formalization of intuition represented
the occlusion of an anarchic living world, but that thereby promised the
opening of this closure through the future irruption of the transcendental
phenomenon.
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The manner in which this updated metaphysics of history fed into the
moment of theory can be briefly illustrated. Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions was undoubtedly the most influential historio-
graphic adaptation of the Husserlian figura, pulling the history and phi-
losophy of science into the orbit of phenomenological theory.39 In a typical
succe`s de scandale, Kuhn argued that “normal science” was characterized
not by its openness to experience but by its closure. Not onlywhat is sayable
in a science but also what is see-able is determined by the internal relations
between a set of interlocking axioms, theorems, andobservations thatKuhn
called the paradigm. This set of relations thus functions as a Kantian tran-
scendental formalism, but one that is seen from a Husserlian viewpoint.
According to Kuhn, the paradigm undergoes radical transformation not as
the result of new empirical discoveries but through a process in which
anomalies start to cluster around the perimeter of the paradigm itself, even-
tually rupturing it and instigating a new paradigm. The epistemic rhythm
of Kuhn’s history of science thus follows the stages of the transcendental
reduction: the suspension of formal structures (“normal science”), fol-
lowed by the fleeting appearance of the ruptural phenomenon, and then
the synthesis of a new formal structure.
Althusser’s improvisation on this figure of thought was designed todraw
Marxist social theory into the space of the phenomenological regimen. Al-
thusser called his version of claustral transcendental formalism the prob-
lematic. By stressing the relational and internal character of the objects of
a problematic, Althusser was able to formulate a characteristic phenome-
nological problem: Given that Marx could not discover a new object for
political economy through empirical historical investigation—as all objects
are internal to their own problematics—how then could he transformclas-
sical economics?40 With this question Althusser proclaimed that he was
reading Marx philosophically. In fact his object was not political economy
but Marx’s great opus Capital itself. In a work entitled Reading Capital,
Althusser thus treatsCapital asmarking themoment inwhich thediscipline
of political economy underwent a radical transformation through the
irruption of an unscripted event of knowledge:
To see this invisible, to see these “oversights,” to identify the lacunae in
the fullness of this discourse, the blanks in the crowded text, we need
something quite different from an acute or attentive gaze; we need an
informed gaze, a new gaze, itself produced by a reflection on the “change
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of terrain” on the exercise of vision, in whichMarx pictures the
transformation of the problematic. Here I take this transformation for a
fact, without any claim to analyse the mechanism that unleashed it and
completed it.41
In this way, Althusser was able to remove Marx from the history of
economic thought and incorporate him within a Husserlian metaphysical
history. For Althusser, Marx’s Capitalmarks one of the periodic moments
in which a problematic mutates as a result of the rupturing of its formali-
zation of an empirical domain. In short, rather than offering an account of
economy and society, Althusser reworks the text of Capital in accordance
with the requirements of metaphysical history and the transcendental
epoche´.
Finally, our earlier comments on Foucault’s concept of the episteme can
also be brought forward into this context.Not just the epistemeofTheOrder
of Things but also the concepts of discourse and the historical a priori in
Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge are deeply informed by a phenome-
nological metaphysics of history.42 It is true that thematerials that Foucault
includeswithin his organizing structures havemuch greater variety andhis-
torical density thanKuhn’s or Althusser’s; Foucault’s archaeologyof clinical
medicine, for example, includes physiological theories, hospital buildings,
diagnostic routines, governmental health programs, and more—which is
why we can continue to learn from his works. Yet this variety is finally har-
nessed to phenomenological figures. Foucault is thus not content to treat
the relations among these elements as empirically contingent matters of
historical fact. Instead, he converts them into formal “rules” by using the
Kantian transcendental deduction: What group of discursive relations is
necessary for a particular object to appear? He thereby treats them as rela-
tional conditions for a particular kind of consciousness or gaze.43Moreover,
as already noted in the case of the episteme, there is a strong tendency to
treat these structures as self-enclosed epochal orders, transforming their
historical existence into a transcendental necessity and necessitating their
sudden rupture and “discontinuist” transformation.44
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The presence of this philosophical thematic, however, turns out to be
incompatible with the tasks of historical description that Foucault sets
himself. InTheOrder of Things, Foucault argues that themodern episteme—
the three-dimensional space of the human sciencesmentionedabove—was
preceded by two others. These were the Renaissance episteme of similitudes
and signatures—the mental landscape of hermetic, neo-Platonic natural
philosophy and natural magic—and the classical eighteenth-century
episteme, characterized by taxonomic versions of biology, linguistics, and
economics. There now seems little reason to accept, however, either that
such epochal epistemological structures existed or that they can be usefully
posited as analytical tools. If we consider early modern hermeticism and
neo-Platonic natural philosophy, for example, then recent work suggests
that, far from constituting a general episteme for an intellectual epoch, this
kind of philosophy had a rather restricted dissemination.45 Its religioushet-
erodoxy—in particular its treatment of the world as a domain of hidden
correspondences accessible only to those initiated in the esoteric arts—
placed it outside the religiously orthodox academic mainstream. The fate
of Giordano Bruno is exemplary. The neo-Platonic decipherment of the
world’s enigmatic signatures and hidden correspondences that Foucault
identifies with the Renaissance episteme was thus typically found only
in certain minor princely courts, happy to shelter a degree of religious
heterodoxy.46 It thus remained far removed from the major universities of
northern Italy, Germany, and western Europe, where Aristotelian science
and orthodox metaphysical theology provided the dominant philosophical
discourse until the middle of the seventeenth century.
This reminder of the crucial role played by religion and the church in
the restricted dissemination of Renaissance neo-Platonism is a pointer to
the distance between the episteme (and its analogues) and the empiricalhis-
tory of philosophy. When sciences and philosophies encounter limits and
restrictions, these typically arise not from the apositive relations of their
formalizations but from the concrete obstacles and rivalries they meet in
contested cultural and institutional spaces. ThemaintenanceofAristotelian
science and Thomist metaphysics in Catholic universities during the sev-
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enteenth century, for example, was not the inertial result of an apositive
paradigm, problematic, or episteme. Rather, it represented the concrete
success of the Jesuit order in militantly excluding Galilean-Newtonian
natural philosophy and Hobbesian natural law from the curriculum of
Catholic Schulphilosophie.47 Similarly, a key condition of the eclipse of Ar-
istotelian science and Thomistmetaphysics in Protestant territorieswas the
religiously andpolitically drivenconstructionofantimetaphysical“eclectic”
intellectual cultures, sympathetic to both the new physics and the new sec-
ularist politics.48 This opening of the universities occurred not in the form
of the sudden ruptural appearance of the transcendental phenomenon but
as the result of protracted hand-to-hand intellectual battles, whose out-
comes were never certain.
Transposing the Disciplines
I have already indicated that one of the important insights contained in
Foucault’s version of the history of theory is his argument that the human
sciences emerged not from a single theoretical discovery but as a series of
philosophical reworkings of empirical disciplines. Our argument, though,
is that this reworking took place not through the virtual relations of the
episteme but as a series of concrete intellectual struggles. These were strug-
gles in which academics imbued with phenomenological thematics and
occupying (to varying degrees) the prestigious persona of the theorist
sought to reconstitute a whole variety of disciplines. They did so by treating
them as claustral domains, incapable of comprehending their own emer-
gence through exclusion of the other, and hence as ripe for transformation
by those capable of abstaining from the taken-for-granted and preparing
themselves to receive the ruptural event in all its purity.
Not only was the degree to which this took place entirely contingent—
depending on the role played by local “theory-import” cultures and the
resistance of existing academicdisciplinary cultures—but the forminwhich
it took place depended on the character of the discipline being targeted for
transformation. The manner in which the moment of theory takes place in
literary studies thus differs significantly from parallel events in sociologyor
political science; and the latter differ again from the developments that
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would occur in the reworking of jurisprudence, in those universitieswhere
theory would announce its presence under the banner of critical legal stud-
ies.49 In some cases—for example, the borrowing of Austinian speech-act
theory by the Cambridge school historians—phenomenological themes
seem to have played little or no role, which means that here themoment of
theory will not fit the dominant model discussed in this paper.50 But these
are matters best left to particular investigations. For the moment, as a way
of illustrating some paths of investigation, I will restrict my comments to
two disciplinary domains—literary studies and social theory—and even
here my comments will be partial and selective.
Literary Theory
When, in the 1970s, literary theory opened its campaign for control of
Anglo-American English departments—for example, inworks by Jonathan
Culler, Eagleton, and Jameson—it did so through a particular delegitima-
tion and reconstruction of the existing discipline, in this case various
versions of the so-called New Criticism.51 Drawing on themes taken from
Saussure and Derrida, Barthes and Althusser, these writers declared
the New Criticism to be a closed discourse, an empiricism incapable of
understanding its own constitution as knowledge, and an ideology that
naturalized meaning through the interpellation of occlusive bourgeois
subjectivities and narratives. In short, they engaged in the first part of the
transcendental reduction: the abstention from and problematization of
knowledges declared to occlude their own emergence from the apositive
relations of language or the mode of production, the play of the signifier or
the delirium of semiosis. In doing so, these writers laid claim to the pres-
tigious persona of the theorist, forbidding themselves the natural pleasures
of bourgeois realist narrative and character and gesturing towards tran-
scendental openness to various kinds of hidden, ruptural, or transgressive
meaning.
The fact that the New Criticism was none of the things it was said to
be should not surprise us at this stage. After all, the point of this kind of
problematization is not to conduct a detached investigation into the
relevant discipline. Rather, it is to perform the theorist’s exemplary absten-
tion from the discipline as a natural knowledge; it is to existentially
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transform the theorist’s relation to the discipline as a form of intellectual
conduct and to put a different kind of discipline or inner conduct in its
place. If we do look at the New Criticism with a degree of indifference then
what we find is neither a claustral formalism repressing the delirium of sig-
nification nor an ideological interpellation of a static identity, but some-
thing else altogether. In fact we find a particular versionof thehermeneutics
of the self, carried out using a specially selected literary corpus and trans-
mitted in the highly wrought milieu of the literary seminar of conscience.52
An important source of this version of the hermeneutics of the self was
the nineteenth-century culture of Protestant reading groups. Here, the
point of performing a reading is to display to oneself and other members
of the group how an imbalance in one’s own “sensibility” always compro-
mises access to the true meaning of the text—typically present as a kind of
ineffable concreteness.53 In England this literary ascesis was transmitted
from Protestant Sunday schools into an emerging state school system dur-
ing the nineteenth century, progressively marginalizing the older linguistic
and rhetorical training of the grammar schools.54 By the 1930s it could en-
sure not only the existence of writers like D. H. Lawrence and critics like
F. R. Leavis but also the form in which seminars were conducted and read-
ings took place in many English departments. Leavis’s once-famous exe-
getical routine—in which the interrogative statement, This is so isn’t it? is
to be met with the answer, Yes, but . . .—is thus not a means of closing off
identity by naturalizing meaning.55 Rather, it is a means of organizing an
always-incomplete work of literary self-scrutiny and self-cultivation. In this
setting interpretive statements operate as acts of self-exposure to a seminar
or teacher in whom the true meaning resides but will never be declared,
thereby producing the scarifying close reading. This description of theNew
Criticism is not of course intended as a defense. The literary seminar of
conscience was indeed a very closed affair, not through its occlusion of im-
manently transgressive meaning, however, but simply through its routine
pedagogical operation, as a sectarian milieu for the cultivation of an
exemplary literary sensibility.
We should not allow ourselves, though, to be too disturbed by the fact
that literary theory was able to eviscerate New Criticism without offering a
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true account of it. In the domain we are concerned with, the success of
disciplines is rarely the result of their truth, while their failureoftenhas little
to do with their falsity. In fact, we have already suggested as much with
regards to the combination of Aristotelian science and Thomistmetaphys-
ics in seventeenth-century Germany, whose success in Jesuit universities
was unrelated to its truth and whose failure in Protestant ones was ensured
independently of its falsity. The manner in which literary theory was able
to eclipse the New Criticism should thus be described independently of ei-
ther discipline’s truth or falsity—and certainly not in terms of the irruption
of a new paradigm or problematic. Rather, we need an institutionally ori-
ented investigation of the historical circumstances in which one kind of
pedagogically entrenched hermeneutics of the self was targeted for prob-
lematization and transformation by another. This is not of course the place
for such an investigation, but we can make two comments as pointers to it.
In the first place, it will be worth investigating whether or not the mo-
ment of literary theory represents a return of university metaphysics to a
domain from whence it had been excluded by earlier religious and political
developments. In the case of England and, to a lesser degree, America, too,
the settlement of the religious civil wars of the seventeenth century had
witnessed the marginalization of university metaphysics—as a discipline
whose doctrinalization of the divine mysteries had turned them into in-
struments of heretification and persecution—and the emergence of a
variety of self-consciously antimetaphysical knowledges and cultures.56
Among them was the pietistic Protestant seminar of conscience, in which
doctrinal metaphysical explications of the apophatic mysteries were pro-
scribed as symptomatic of intellectual hubris and lack of grace—a situation
still vividly present in the radically antitheoretical stance of the Leavis
seminar.57
How then should we look at the way in which this intellectual milieu
was placed into question by the literary-theoretical campaigns of the
1970s? To answer this question our prime focus would be on the fact that
literary theory was reactivating the central theme of phenomenological
metaphysics, namely, the relation between a domain of infinite and un-
containable meanings and the being whose finitude both occludes this
domain yet, in doing so, promises the possibility of openness to it. At the
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same time, literary theory was elaborating this relation in its own theo-
retical vernacular. Here, rather than consciousness, it was language and
literature that occupied center stage, and the drama of the transcendental
reduction was played out in terms of the eclipsing of the author by the
transcendental anonymity of the codes, the irruption of a corporeal se-
miotic into an occlusive symbolic, the dissolving of the signified into the
infinite play of signification, andmuchmore in this vein. At the very least,
there is enough here to suggest that we could begin investigating the mo-
ment of literary theory in terms of the historical circumstances that per-
mitted a metaphysical hermeneutics—long cultivated in the universities
of eastern and central Europe—to penetrate the academic culture of En-
gland and America, where its bridgehead was provided by university lit-
erature departments.
Second, this element of real novelty at the level of spiritual exercises
should not prevent us from investigating the possibility of a deep continuity
at the level of pedagogical milieu. After all, is it not clear enough that the
New Criticism and the literary theory that displaced it both have an in-
tensely ascetic-pedagogical dimension? In the New Criticism this takes the
form of a routinely ruthless exposure of literary seminarians to the inner
chagrin of an impossibly concrete meaning. In literary theory it takes place
as the more self-conscious ascesis of the transcendental epoche´, which re-
quires a fundamental act of self-forbidding as the condition of obtaining
the fleeting state of transcendental openness. More importantly, if, as we
have suggested, the objects of literary theory are no more universally avail-
able than those of the New Criticism, then is it not likely that the former
will have to avail itself of the same mechanism as the latter—the discipline
of the seminar of conscience overseen by an exemplary persona—to bring
these objects into quasi-public visibility?
Consider, for example, the once-notorious case in which Stanley Fish
presented his seminar with a supposed seventeenth-century devotional
poem—in fact an arbitrary list of words formatted as such a poem—in
order to demonstrate the “production” of poetic meanings grounded ul-
timately in the “authority of interpretive communities.”58 Fish’s discussion
erases the fact that nothing would have led his students to produce such
interpretations of this list other than that they were elicited by their teacher
as part of an ethically compulsive and institutionally compulsory task of
behavior. Further, nothing validates them as poetic interpretations other
than Fish’s declaration that they are such. For what is Fish’s experiment
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other than a mini-dramatization of the literary transcendental epoche´ it-
self? What we see in Fish’s seminar is a little theater in which the anarchy
of unstructured meanings will be briefly presented in order to show how
the closure of meaning occurs through the imposed authority of a com-
munity of interpreters.
By treating authority as a transcendental necessity required to close
the arbitrariness of meaning, Fish obscures the existence of an entirely his-
torical and contingent authority—his own as the exemplary master of the
seminar of conscience—which is exercised to ensure that students will re-
gard meaning as arbitrary. Presiding over this updated hermeneutic semi-
nar, Fish requires his students to abstain from the “natural” assumption
that texts exist and havemeanings, thereby enforcing a literary simulacrum
of the transcendental reduction. The fact that this regimen forms a central
part of their training as apprentice theorists provides a context for Latour’s
comment that “entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that
good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up,
that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth,
that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak from a par-
ticular standpoint, and so on.”59We can suggest, then, that if literary theory
and deconstructive philosophywalked into theAmerican academy through
the doors of the literature department, it was the pedagogical relations
maintained there that gave it the ethical force to do so.
Social Theory
In discussing our second instance of the phenomenological transposi-
tion of the disciplines—Habermas’s social theory—we shall also seek to
clarify a kind of political demeanor characteristic of themoment of theory.
There will be some, particularly those committed to Franco-American de-
construction, who will regard Habermas as an implausible or peripheral
participant in the theoretical moment, owing to his briefly notorious attack
on deconstructive and poststructuralist theory.60 Seenhistorically,however,
Habermas’s social theory is a central and influential example of the phe-
nomenological reworking of a disciplinary field, in this case sociology.
Despite Habermas’s once-vaunted (now airbrushed) credentials as a
Marxist, Husserlian phenomenology was always the driving philosophy in-
forming his social theory. This can be seen not just in the crucial use he
makes of Husserl’s concept of the Lebenswelt but, just as importantly, in
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his constitutive use of Husserl’s philosophical history or metaphysical
hermeneutics, which Habermas derived from the first generation of the
Frankfurt school theorists.61 Habermas’s philosophical history is thus one
that treats history as a series of attempts to take hold of the contents of
traditional metaphysics—the notion of an infinite, transcendent mind
spontaneously intelligizing all possible meanings—and to detranscenden-
talize it, thereby making reason available in the register of politics and so-
ciety.62 According to Habermas, Kant made an important contribution to
this process through his transposition of the divinemind into the categories
of human subjectivity. Yet, as in Husserl’s account, Kant himself remains
trapped within a philosophy of consciousness, owing to his failure to pen-
etrate its nonsubjective conditions. Through his concept of the lifeworld—
as a domain of pretheoretical everyday intuitions—Husserlprovidescrucial
insight into these conditions, even if the great phenomenologist himself
finally fails to break with the category of consciousness. It is thus left to the
Frankfurt school and to Habermas himself to complete the detranscenden-
talization of metaphysics through his concept of discourse, understood as
the social communication of meanings in a suitably idealized speech
situation.
What commentators have yet to make sufficiently clear is the degree to
whichHabermas’s social theory—particularly in hismagnumopusTheThe-
ory of Communicative Action—takes place as ametaphysical hermeneuticsof
history. By treating society as something that evolves in tandemwith its the-
orization, Habermas can present his theory of social communication in the
form of a chain of hermeneutic commentaries on the great sociologists—
Marx, Durkheim,Weber, Parsons, the Frankfurt school writers—and some
kindred philosophers of language—Peirce, Dewey, and Austin in particu-
lar.63 As in the Kantian prototype, this hermeneutic chain is envisaged as a
progressive refinement of man’s intellectual and social relations leading to
the realization of a buried capacity for rational self-determination,although
inHabermas this takes aHusserliandetranscendentalizeddirectiontowards
discursive relations in the lifeworld. In keeping with the Husserlianmodel,
each stage in the process takes place in the form of a brief but fundamental
breakthrough to lifeworld intuitions—Marx’s grasp of the importance of
productive relations, Durkheim’s conception of society as the social form
of religious and philosophical categories, Weber’s understanding of the
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rationalization of society—that is then occluded through the elaborationof
formal theorizations themselves complicit with society as system.64 Once
again the regimen of the transcendental epoche´ plays the organizing role
here, as nothing proves the problematic character of the great sociological
theories other than Habermas’s decision to problematize them, as repeated
breakthroughs to and formalizations of the domain of lifeworld intuitions.
Moreover, the eschatological dimension of historical metaphysics is again
clearly visible, as the possibility of final breakthrough to this domain pro-
vides the hermeneutic chain with its telos, even if the revelatory moment
will now take place not in the form of a delirious literary epiphany but in
the more sober setting of the ideal speech situation.
The (Left-rationalist) political theory that Habermas extrapolates from
his social theory is also strongly marked by the phenomenological regimen
and its metaphysics of history. The central term ofHabermas’s politics, jur-
idification, is deployed in accordance with the now-familiar ambivalence
associated with the formalization of the lifeworld.65 On the one hand,
Habermas characterizes the juridification of social relations associatedwith
Hobbesian political jurisprudence—which reorganized property relations
and provided the constitutional basis for absolute sovereignty over the old
society of estates—as indicative of a nullification of the existing lifeworld
that would give rise to self-enclosed bureaucratic systems. This repressive
occlusion of lifeworld intuitions and freedoms is specifically ascribed to the
formal-positive character of law, which allows government to be justified
in purely procedural, nonmoral terms. On the other hand, because it is
capable of defending citizens’ rights and setting constitutional limits to
sovereignty and because it remains in touch with normative, consensus-
forming discussion contexts of the lifeworld—here the public sphere—the
law remains a possible channel for the resurgence of the lifeworld into the
system. Habermas thus understands discursive democracy as the space in
which the unscripted intuitions and norms of the lifeworld, purged of
their irrational nationalist energies via the consensus-forming ideal speech
situation, will break through the juridified structures of the state, recasting
them in accordance with the principles of true justice.66
Given the preceding discussion—in which we have shown several times
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67. Heckel’s essays and treatises have now been collected inMartinHeckel,Gesammelte
Schriften: Staat, Kirche, Rechte, Geschichte, ed. Klaus Schlaich, 5 vols. (Tu¨bingen, 1989–97).
68. See Heckel, “Religionsbannund landesherrlichesKirchenregiment,” inDie lutherische
Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland, ed. Hans-ChristophRublack (Gu¨tersloh, Germany, 1992), pp.
130–62 and “Die religionsrechtlicheParita¨t,”Gesammelte Schriften, 1:227–323.
69. See Heckel, “Zur Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts von der Reformation bis
zur Schwelle derWeimarer Verfassung,” inGesammelte Schriften, 1:366–401.
that this way of characterizing and problematizing historical structures
owes almost nothing to historical investigation and almost everything to
the transcendental reduction—perhaps we can be forgiven for dealingwith
Habermas’s account of juridification summarily. It would be redundant to
observe that none of themany works of empirical history dedicated to early
modern Germany has uncovered any evidence for the existence of the
lifeworld, as this is a device of philosophical-ascetic self-transformation,not
a category of historical description. It does need to be said, though, that
these works also do not support the existence of a fundamental moment of
juridification as understood by Habermas.
If we look at the remarkable essays of Martin Heckel—the foremost
historian of German Staatsrecht (public law, political jurisprudence) and
Staatskirchenrecht (political and constitutional church law)—then a quite
different picture of juridification emerges.67 Here, the term juridification
refers not to the metaphysical-historical moment of occlusion of the life-
world and its future restoration but to something else altogether. It refers
in fact to a particular historical process whereby, in order to end religious
civil war and establish legal parity between the two great confessionalblocs,
the institutions of imperial public law gradually displaced theology in ad-
judicating disputes and establishing the terms of coexistence for conflicting
religions.68 This process may well have helped transform the terrain of poli-
tics, lending support to aHobbesian conception of sovereignty inwhich the
autonomizing of politics is matched by the restriction of its scope to the
end of social peace. This transformation took place, however, not as an oc-
clusion of lifeworld norms and intuitions by the formal-positive character
of law but as a result of the protracted establishment of a new norm for
politics: themaintenance of a territorial state’s external securityandinternal
social peace. Far from being an obstacle to this new norm of religious neu-
trality, the formality and positivity of law helped make it possible by ex-
cluding recourse to transcendent religious norms in legislative contexts,but
doing so in a manner that offered protection to those who pursued these
norms in extrapolitical settings.69This is the history of juridification thatHa-
bermas’s metaphysics of history turns its back on. It does so by arguing for
the political reinstatement of transcendent norms, this time in the form of
the supposedly detranscendentalizedmetaphysics of discursive democracy.
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Concluding Remarks
Needless to say, the preceding discussion neither exhausts the topic of
the history of theory nor pretends to be the last word. In fact it is intended
only to open a space in which this topic can be taken up and to provide
some rough outlines of how it might be filled. To open this space, however,
it was necessary to turn asideDerrida’s argument that philosophy couldnot
be subject to historical description. We had to treat the central tenet of this
argument—philosophy’s claim to open man’s empirical finitude to the
irruptive infinity of being—as itself a symptom of a particular historical
phenomenon: a philosophical ascesis associated with the cultivation of a
particular intellectual persona. In the wake of this historicization, other
proxy concepts for the transcendental phenomenon—the diffe´rance of
writing, the infinite play of signification, the corporeal delirium of the se-
miotic, the self-writing of the codes—lose their universality and their aura
in becoming instruments and objects for a particular work of the self on
the self.
We have indicated that the manner and degree to which this philosoph-
ical ascesis goes to work on the field of empirical disciplines—transforming
them into structures of transcendental possibility, problematizing their
claustral character in relation to being, promising to cultivate a new kind
of openness—is itself a matter for historical investigation. Given the variety
of disciplinary and indeed national contexts in which this transposition of
the disciplines has taken place, the sketches provided above should be
treated as indicative and provisional, pointers to a space of investigation in
which quite different and unexpected instancesmight appear.Nonetheless,
for such investigations to take place it will be necessary to discard the phe-
nomenologically inspired concepts of the “paradigm” and the problematic,
and even Foucault’s more historically sensitive concepts of the episteme,
discourse, and the historical a priori. The manner in which philosophy re-
worked the empirical disciplines was a matter not of virtual relations within
apositive systems but of concrete intellectual combat associated with the re-
turn of a certain kind of metaphysics to the Anglo-American academy.
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